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During an interview for the BBC in December 2016, leading Brexiter and 
Conservative MP, Michael Gove quipped that the ‘Brexit vote was like “the civil war 
without muskets”’ (2016). No doubt overstating things, as usual, and certainly crass, 
given the murder by a far-right activist a few months earlier of the Labour MP, Jo 
Cox, in Birstall, West Yorkshire -- the first political assassination incidentally to have 
occurred in Britain since 1990 -- the motif of civil war in political discourse in Britain, 
both during and since the EU Referendum in June 2016, now constitutes something 
of a commonplace. ‘Don’t mention the civil war’, proclaimed The Guardian in January 
2018, ‘the English are still fighting it’ (Kettle 2018). The previous year, Lord Bird had 
issued the ominous warning: ‘this could be a civil war scenario’; prompting The 
Express to state that ‘Brexit tensions could lead to “Blood on the streets” as part of 
[a] “civil war”’ (Heffer 2017). Nigel Farage threatened: ‘if people feel voting doesn’t 
change anything, then violence is the next step’ (Farage in Simons 2016). In a more 
recent iteration of the motif, former Liberal-Democrat leader, Vince Cable mused: ‘I 
would go so far as to say Britain is now mired in a protracted, non-violent civil war’ 
(2018); while influential political commentator, Peter Hitchens has expressed his own 
fear that the UK is moving ‘into a pre-civil war condition’ (Hitchens in Dugmore 
2017). Economist, Will Hutton, has said of Brexit: ‘It is barely disguised civil war’ 
(2018). And on this one point, at least, he and Arron Banks -- the businessman and 
co-founder of the Leave.EU campaign -- agree. Banks boasted, however, that not 
only was Brexit ‘a war’ but his side ‘won’ and those on the losing side -- the 
metropolitan elite, the ‘remoaners’, as the belligerent right likes to describe the 48% 
who voted remain -- should just ‘get over it’ (Banks in Cadwalladr 2017).  
 
Tempting though it may be to dismiss this talk as just hyperbole, exaggeration, 
baloney or sensationalist bluster, I think there is more to this rhetorical 
intensification of civil war discourse than can be dismissed as mere grandstanding 
by politicians, some fretful cri de coeur by the liberal commentariat or attention-
seeking antics by headline-grabbing newspapers. An intriguing analysis by Stefan 
Collignon, a political economist at the European Institute of the London School of 
Economics, has revealed an uncanny resemblance between the ‘political map of 
the Brexit vote’ (2018) -- the distribution of support for either remain or leave -- 
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and the regional distribution of support, in the 1640s, that divided the country 
between the Parliamentary cause and those who rallied to the defence of the King 
and court. The parallels are salutary, rather than specious, and more than justify 
the claim -- as he puts it -- that Brexit ‘has the semblance of a new English civil 
war’ (2018). He explains this semblance by way of an apparent isomorphism 
between the political maps of 1642 and 2016 as follows: much like today, in 1642, 
England confronted glaring economic inequality, which divided the country into a 
prosperous London and south-east -- reliant on international trade under 
conditions of early modern globalisation, and the deprived rural hinterlands in the 
North and West of England, which had suffered from years of neglect and 
impoverishment. In a further echo with contemporary Britain, during the civil war, 
the King found no support in Scotland, while Ireland -- even if it had wanted to --  
could not help, since it was itself mired in internecine conflict. The 
Parliamentarians drew their support primarily from the cities, as did the Remain 
vote; while -- Collignon shows -- the same regions and constituencies that 
supported the Cavaliers in the 1640s swung in 2016 behind the anti-EU Leave 
campaigns. ‘Britain’, he observed in conclusion, ‘has effectively returned to the 
politics of the time before it was a United Kingdom’ (2018). Far from resolving the 
divisions in the country, the Referendum cleaved Britain wide open, splitting it --  
according to Collignon -- between a closed, nostalgic and inward-facing English 
nationalism, and those who continue to adhere to the ‘liberal idea that opening 
markets will overcome nationalism and generate a common culture’ (2018).  
 
This, no doubt, is an oversimplification on Collignon’s part. Many Remain voters 
would not consider themselves economic liberals, just as not all Leave voters 
were xenophobes and nationalists. An alternative version would be that the Brexit 
vote was delivered by a coalition of the non-university-educated, whether working-
class (radicalized after years of shouldering the burden of a financial collapse they 
did not cause) or wealthy and retired or close to it, revealing a hitherto overlooked 
but crucial non-metropolitan constituency. The peculiarity is that just at a time 
when British politics appeared to be moving towards European-style coalition 
forms of government, Brexit has produced a binarized debate, in which otherwise 
highly unlikely coalitions are formed. What that further complexity indicates is the 
factional confusion of contemporary British politics -- the blurring of left and right, 
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and of the political divisions that span the benches of Westminster and beyond -- 
a confusion, in short, that effectively signals the collapse of the political consensus 
that has prevailed in the UK since the 1980s in which the political mainstream 
embraced Europeanisation and globalisation.[{note}]1 What Britain confronts, as a 
result of this breakdown, is a general crisis of enculturation at the level of political 
identity formation. It is a crisis of enculturation to the extent that it not only touches 
every major institution in the UK, from the civil service, to university, to parliament, 
to NHS trust, etc.; but because it challenges, more fundamentally, the nation in its 
very identity -- it strikes at the heart of what it means to be ‘British’.[{note}]2 As a 
crisis of general enculturation, Brexit incapacitates that most fundamental of 
mechanisms of national cohesion -- once described by the German philosopher, 
Jürgen Habermas, as the ‘interpretative system’, essential for cultivating a sense 
of social integration: a society’s ability to arrive at a self-conception before which 
all differences are dissolved. Brexit tears up the appearance of consensus around 
what British identity is;[{note}]3 it deconstructs the narrative, painstakingly built 
over decades, around ‘British values’ and the reputation of the British polity for an 
unswerving political and economic ‘pragmatism’. What threatens is political and 
systemic chaos -- this occurs when, Habermas notes, ‘the consensual foundations 
of normative structures are so much impaired that the society becomes anomic. 
Crisis states assume the form of a disintegration of social institutions’ (1976: 3).  
 
There is no doubting that such a general crisis of enculturation has followed the 
collapse of the so-called centre ground of British politics -- the centre here being 
code for what used to be known as the ‘third way’ consensualist political paradigm 
-- signalling a major challenge to the hegemony of neoliberalism, with its overlay 
of Blairite ‘social democratic’ features, not just in the UK, but across Europe as 
such.[{note}]4 After all, the ‘contagion’ of populism -- by no means confined to the 
UK -- has led the French president, Emanuel Macron, to also invoke the spectre of 
civil war: ‘There seems to be’, he said, in a speech in April 2018, ‘a certain 
European civil war … [a] deadly tendency which might lead our continent to the 
abyss’.  What this enculturation crisis signifies, however, is not simply a collapse 
of the centre, but -- to derive a more specific formulation from the work of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe -- the ‘polarization of the political terrain’.[{note}]5 
Meeting this challenge now dominates politics in post-Referendum Britain as it 
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does in many other democracies across the globe. Now, it is into this pyretic and 
feverish environment that the National Theatre bravely strayed in March 2017, 
with its theatrical representation of the Referendum campaign of 2016, in Carol 
Ann Duffy and Rufus Norris’s ‘verbatim’ play My Country: A work in progress. And 
it is this play, and, more specifically, the position of the National Theatre itself -- 
the way it sought to position itself via this play, addressing the crisis of the 
plebiscite in its role as the UK’s ‘state theatre’ -- that I would like to examine here 
in this essay. I will start with a brief discussion of the play, and then consider its 
relation to the problematic of civil war -- the discourse of ‘civil war’, which (in the 
current situation) is none other than code for the rise of populism as a response to 
the crisis-inducing effects of austerity on both British politics and wider society.  
 
To begin with, it should be noted that My Country was one of the first plays 
initiated by Rufus Norris in his new role as the director of the National Theatre, 
taking over from the previous incumbent, Nicholas Hytner, in 2015 -- important not 
least because the arrival of Norris signalled a dramatic ‘democratic’ turn in the 
leadership of the National, away from the more patrician decade under Hytner. 
The effect was palpable at the box-office. According to the National Theatre’s 
annual review of 2016--17, in his first year, the National Theatre reached a near 
capacity audience, ‘making it the best attended programme in over a decade’. 
Over the course of the year, the report noted, ‘we commemorated our nation’s 
shared history’ with Jeremy Deller’s memorial of the 100th anniversary of the 
Battle of the Somme, We’re here because we’re here, and -- ‘we responded to the 
EU Referendum -- the biggest political event of our generation -- with My Country: 
a work in progress which recorded the views from people across the UK and put 
their words centre stage’ (2016/17). Not only did My Country tour a number of 
cities across the UK -- playing at theatre’s such as the Warwick Arts Centre, 
Birmingham Rep and Glasgow Citizen’s theatre -- it was also adapted for 
television, and screened on BBC2 on 14th November 2017 -- justifying, perhaps, 
Norris’s claim that under his leadership the National Theatre had become ‘even 
more national, even more participatory, and even more diverse -- living up to our 
ambition to be a theatre for everyone’.[{note}]6 Indeed, that ambition -- to be a 
truly national theatre -- is refracted through the central conceit of the play, where -- 
in order to mobilise the voices of the nation -- in order to hear this ‘verbatim’ 
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testimony -- the nation had to be summoned to ‘listen’ to those voices, to listen to 
itself -- directly and in an apparently unmediated fashion -- yes, in the theatre, but 
more importantly ‘in the words of people across the UK’. The national theatre 
became a kind of supplementary space in which to reflect upon the state of the 
state, and an ancillary space to that of the highly fractious public sphere in which 
the politics of Brexit -- in all their ferocity -- were (just as they continue to be) 
played out; what the National Theatre sought to produce was a space where one 
could listen but also where a lesson could be drawn by silencing the angry din of 
political contestation raging outside -- the word ‘listen’, a running motif throughout 
the play, is an anagram of ‘silent’. The final lines of the play ended with a plea, 
directed not just to the audience, but to the country at large and its political class: 
‘We cannot stand in judgement on each other’s lives. But we should search and 
strive for good leadership. Are you listening? Do I hear you listening?’ (Duffy and 
Norris 2017: 58).  
 
How well, then, did the National Theatre fare? To broach this question, I would 
like to begin with a consideration of the dramaturgical structure of the play. The 
first thing to observe is the play’s use of identity categories as metaphors via the 
personification of the regions of Britain by its actors; but it is those same actors 
who also, shedding their symbolic roles, utter the transcribed words of Norris and 
Duffy’s interviewees. As they speak the words of the verbatim text, each actor 
holds up a photograph of the actual person who had said them -- transforming 
each, in effect, into vox pops; second, the verbatim sections are interspersed with 
scripted dialogue in which, as one reviewer observed, ‘regional stereotypes [are 
used] to get laughs’ (Tripney 2017) -- with banter reminiscent of Ealing Comedies, 
or the films of Bill Forsythe; thirdly, the dramaturgical setting of the play is that of a 
constitutional convention, convoked by none other than Britannia herself, where 
Britain’s regions have been summoned to gather. Why? Because ‘[o]nce again’, 
as Britannia declares, ‘we find ourselves at a crucial moment in our nation’s 
history’ (Duffy and Norris 2017: 6). Note that the rhetorical emphasis placed on 
the collectivised subject of ‘our’ nationhood is overshadowed by the portent of 
history and crisis. Britannia, played by Penny Layden, is dressed in conventional 





‘Before witnesses’, she says, ‘we shall listen to those voices we have gathered 
and see what we can learn. You are the spirits and hearts of your regions and you 
honour the voices of your people’ (2017: 6). Caledonia, the South-West, Cymru, 
Northern Ireland, the East Midlands and the North East each appear -- though 
not, it should be observed, remain-voting London and the South-East (or other 
cities for that matter) -- an omission that did not go unremarked in the national 
press, with Dominic Cavendish writing in The Telegraph:  
 
With London and the South-East exempt from the party, Remoaners are thin on 
the ground and members of the metropolitan elite may need to reach for the 
nearest bottle of Chianti to wash away their distaste at some of what they hear. 
(2017) 
 
There are other exclusions too, which I shall briefly note: one glaring omission is 
that of any European voices in the play -- and in particular of those who have 
made the UK their home; there is also at best a limited acknowledgment of the 
cultural diversity -- both historical and contemporary -- of Britain, with little 
recognition of Commonwealth and other diasporas; and we hear nothing from the 
expat Brits living on the continent of Europe. This is not simply an oversight or 
moment of neglect, but a poetic choice to present Britain, barring a few tokens, as 
essentially homogenous, monocultural, and ethnically white.[{note}]7 In this 
sense, if the National Theatre’s aim was to ‘speak to the nation for the nation’, to 
produce a kind of national poem, the play already operates within a tacit decision 
regarding who is to be included in that poetic vision of the nation, and who is to be 
excluded from it. Recalling the idea of nation and its etymological links to natality, 
this -- the play proclaims -- is the ‘gathering of the family of Britannia’ (Duffy and 
Norris 2017). It is a meeting ‘Inter se conveniente Britanniae’ -- a meeting ‘among 
ourselves’, among the nations of Britain -- where the vision of Britain is one that 
hearkens back to 1707 and the Act of Union. But, also, there is a wider question 
that can be raised in relation to this hearkening, regarding the play’s forgetfulness 
of Britain’s imperial past: of the racialized and class-inflected inequalities that it 
instituted, and that still persist, in which the personification of Britain as Britannia 
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‘takes back control’ of history by appealing to the myth of a once unified nation 
state that never was. 
 
Let’s consider this interesting figure of Britannia for a moment. It hardly needs 
saying that she has a long history, dating back to the first century AD and the 
Roman conquest of Britain. The earliest sculptural relief, found in Aphrodesias in 
Turkey, shows Britannia being overpowered by the Emperor Claudius, in an 
image of subjection at the hands of an earlier continental power. After the fall of 
Rome, Britannia seems to have disappeared as a cultural signifier of any note and 
only re-emerges as a national muse after the Reformation. In the early nineteenth 
century she is represented as the defender of virtue, against the programme of 
radical reformers in the 1830s (as a print by George Cruikshank shows); she also 
picks up the martial attributes of a seafaring power -- she is henceforth associated 
with British naval force, invoked in times of national peril as the great protectoress, 
and later with British colonial and military exploits. In an image, published in Judy, 
in 1879, entitled ‘retribution’, Britannia can be witnessed violently subduing King 
Cetewayo, during the Anglo-Zulu war. Not all depictions are quite so explicitly 
racist, however, and Britannia even makes an appearance on behalf of the 
abolitionist cause -- as can be seen in her depiction as a Virgin Mary figure, where 
she is meant to prick the nation’s conscience and awaken it to the horrors of 
slavery; while, in another image, Britannia becomes an emancipatory symbol, who 




Madge Dresser notes, Britannia is a ‘syncretistic construct which linked 
Amazonian fertility goddesses with patriarchal assertions of imperial power’ (1989: 
41), but like any symbol, she is the bearer of complex historical traces, and thus 
constitutes a site of political and ideological contestation. And I think this is the 
point worth examining, in relation to My Country -- she is more than a 
recognizable trope of British patriotism, a convenient structuring device or a 
symbolic representation of British nationhood -- she is also, insofar as she is that 
symbol, a surface of inscription. But what does the play seek to inscribe on its 
image of Britannia? I think it is nothing other than the values of Norris’s National 
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Theatre itself, and it is by means of this inscription, that it inserted itself, quite 
literally, to borrow from the NTs mission statement, into the ‘wider national 
conversation’ over Brexit. Britannia is both the symbol that speaks for the British 
family of nations -- insofar as she alone is capable of listening, of bearing witness 
-- this poetic muse of the poet laureate -- and she also emblematizes the National 
Theatre and its aspiration to be ‘a theatre for the whole nation, a theatre for 
everyone’ (NT, ‘Our Mission’).  
 
Britannia, my name is Britannia. 
I am your memory, your dialects, your cathedrals, your mosques and 
markets, schools and pubs, your woods, mountains, rivers… your 
motorways and railway lines, your hospitals, your cenotaphs with paper 
poppies fading in the rain. I have breathed you in, like air, and breathed 
you out as prayer, or speech, or song. I am your heartbeat and I take your 
pulse. Who else but me can praise your ancient, living language as a 
jewel? Or trace our wars in raised, ugly scars on her flesh? 
 (Duffy and Norris 2017: 38) 
 
I don’t think it is so farfetched to trace the sentiment expressed here back to the 
National Theatre’s origins, in the nineteenth century, in the campaign to build a 
House for Shakespeare -- but that is an incidental point, other than to say that 
such arguments were already founded on the aspiration to deploy culture 
‘ideologically’ as a means of symbolically unifying the polity around the 
construction of a ‘national’ canon. Today, that aspiration, realized in the form of 
the National Theatre, has not only become a reality; it is a reality that rests upon 
the accumulation of immense cultural and symbolic capital, albeit bestowed upon 
it, in material terms, through actual capital (with high levels of government 
funding); while its ideological aspect derives from its absorption, in the 1990s, of 
the liberal doctrines promoted by New Labour of ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘pluralism’ and 
increasing ‘diversity’. These values inflect the play in contradictory ways, and the 
tacit identification of Britannia and the National Theatre is to be understood, as a 
consequence, in relation to those contradictions -- just as are the two central 
planks constituting the theatre’s self-defining mission: ‘to better understand 
ourselves and the world around us’ and to ‘[show] us who we are, who we have 
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been, who we could be’. In other words, it is the entire ensemble of cultural 
values, upon which the National Theatre’s normative structures rest, that My 
Country inadvertently exposed as contestable. 
 
This is how Britannia expresses her role, her function in the play: 
 
 So. 
Listen to me and let me hear your words:  
not to agree, but -- as the song of birds  
reveals the light, 
the darkness lessening --  
to hear this human music; silence loosening 
within the Sacrament of Listening… 
… I move to the Opening Voices. Verbatim 
(Duffy and Norris 2017: 10--11) 
 
Just as the song of birds reveals the light, and lessens the darkness -- so the 
theatre, a space of light and of listening, has the power to illuminate that which is 
otherwise clouded in opacity. What is this sacrament of listening? The word 
sacrament signifies baptism or confirmation; but also, it indicates a ceremonial 
and performative act imparting spiritual grace -- again it is worth recalling that 
Britannia is often depicted as a secularised Virgin Mary figure. What is it to impart 
spiritual ‘grace’? It is to offer deliverance from enemies, from adversity and 
affliction. Britannia becomes the spiritual guide who offers those who are prepared 
to listen both forgiveness and salvation -- she opens the space in which our sins, 
our offenses, our trespasses can be forgiven. She listens to us in silence, without 
judgement: she is an impartial observer, standing above the fray, apparently 
without interest or faction. She is offered as an unsullied point of identification: a 
national symbol of reconciliation and healing. She is there to remind us of who we 
once were, who we are, and who we yet might be -- if, that is, we are able to see 
beyond the differences that divide us. So, it is in light of this symbolic and 
sacramental effect that we can understand, I think, how the National Theatre --  
enunciating principles of clemency, decency, benevolence and mercifulness -- 
sought to position itself following the 2016 Referendum as the great unifier of a 
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divided nation. In doing so, however, the theatre inevitably ran into an insuperable 
difficulty: the political reality of Brexit. Let me briefly indicate this difficulty through 
some of the critical responses to the play. Michael Billington proclaimed that while 
never dull, My Country ‘tends to confirm what we already knew: that the 
referendum has revealed just how fractious and divided we are as a nation’ 
(2017). Worse still, ‘the overriding impression is of a country filled with a 
simmering resentment’ (Billington 2017). Natasha Tripney, writing in The Stage, 
remarked that it ‘feels like a belated attempt to put a sticking plaster on a gushing 
wound’ (2017). And the Times’s Christopher Hart opined: ‘This National show is a 
brave stab at the Brexit debate, but we’re left with a nation at war’ (2017). Here, 
once again, we have that motif of a nation at war with itself -- the discourse of civil 
war with which I began, and to which I would now like to return for a more detailed 
analysis. 
 
Consider the problem of the political reality of Brexit. What the National Theatre 
did can be thought in terms of two positional operations: first, it deployed the 
symbolism of Britannia in order to insert itself in the ‘national conversation’ around 
Brexit; but, in doing so, it also sought to extract itself from the political fray -- to 
place itself above it. The viability of performing these two apparently contradictory 
operations, is -- I think -- certainly open to question. To indicate the nature of the 
deeper problem here I’d like to make reference to an earlier play about civil war, to 
draw a parallel between them (if I can be forgiven this indulgence) by reading My 
Country in relation to the Oresteia -- and its fundamental problem. In the Oresteia, 
the fundamental problem is not, in fact, how to put an end to the series of killings -
- the affliction of the House of Atreus -- which reaches its conclusion in the trial of 
Orestes; it is how to prevent those killings from spilling over into a general 
conflagration into which the entire polis will be drawn. It is, in short, how to prevent 
what the ancient Greeks called stasis, and which we translate variously by the 
terms civil or internal war, and, more generically, civil strife; but stasis is also, 
essentially, demotic in form -- it indicates the threat posed by populism to the unity 
of the polity. I will note two parallels that are instructive here, then: first, that in the 
Oresteia we find the central figure and symbolism of Athena occupying the centre 
of the play -- another goddess who embodies the ideal of the polis -- which mirrors 
the role played, in My Country, by Britannia; second, we have the identification of 
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the real ground of the problem of stasis, which is not the war in the family as such, 
but the way that war threatens to develop beyond the family, through the factional 
divisions that erupt within a vengeful populace, represented in the Oresteia by the 
chorus and in My Country through verbatim vox pops. The people appear, they 
speak, in choric form -- and what they say is disturbing -- expressing profound 
grievances, resentments and general disaffection. In My Country this choric 
function appears in the verbatim elements of the play, arranged thematically into 
sections on ‘Patriotism’, ‘Europe’, ‘Hardship’, ‘Immigration’ and the ‘vote’. And just 
as Athena appeals to the chorus to set aside their grievances, to show mercy and 
forgiveness, so Britannia makes the demand on the country, on a country riven by 
division, to overcome those divisions through the injunction ‘to listen’. But this is to 
misunderstand two things, I think, about the current situation. 
 
First, it misunderstands the nature of political antagonism and the formation of 
popular demands -- that in a context of stasis, of the bifurcation of the political 
terrain, society has -- if I may borrow terms offered by Ernesto Laclau -- structured 
itself around ‘two incompatible equivalential chains’ (2007: 83--86) -- those of 
‘Brexit’ and ‘Remain’. The chasm that separates them is radical and cannot be 
reasoned away, since it involves profound ‘libidinal’ attachments, but also real 
underlying grievances. Stasis, above all, signifies a phenomenon that we might 
call ‘affective democracy’ -- consisting not of a reasoning public, but impassioned 
popular political identities. Within the hegemonic struggle of Brexit, the word 
‘Brexiter’, with all its connotations of buccaneering, anti-establishment defiance, 
crystallizes the point upon which a plurality of popular demands that have little to 
do with one another in themselves converge in a single identity. This brings me to 
the second problem: along with the construction of the popular identity, there is 
also the identification of what Laclau calls the ‘global enemy’ (2007: 91). 
Remainer, metropolitan elite, enemy of the people -- are obvious examples that 
the Brexit supporting press has popularized. But here I want to simply note that 
what this dynamic affords is a way of understanding what are currently termed 
‘culture wars’, but which in fact indicate the general crisis of enculturation that 
underpins the current crisis of legitimacy confronting political and cultural 
institutions. That is why, institutional responses -- for instance those of the 
judiciary -- fail to grasp how popular identification with Brexit responds to an 
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entirely different logic to that of law and legality; it is a political logic that involves 
the withdrawal of consent from institutional structures that are identified with the 
status quo. And it is in relation to this last point that the National Theatre’s position 
-- of inserting itself into the national conversation, but extracting itself from the 
political fray -- runs up against political reality: when there is stasis, there is no 
position impervious to the effects of the political. 
 
In other words -- under conditions of stasis -- a profound schism emerges 
between what Habermas termed, on the one hand, the ‘validity claims constitutive 
for the cultural reproduction of life’ (1976: 5) -- expressed as whatever claims to 
truth or rightness as are required to undergird the legitimacy of political and 
cultural institutions -- and the ‘life world’ context, on the other, that rewards those 
institutions with mass loyalty by acquiescing to those claims. When those truth 
claims ‘forfeit [their] sense of discursive redeemability’ (1976: 6), i.e., when they 
are no longer considered to represent the ‘truth’, it is because they are perceived 
to be indistinguishable, Habermas notes, from other ‘control media’ such as 
power, money, social influence and so on. I would suggest one can view the 
dilemma confronting the National Theatre in corresponding terms: viewed 
politically, the National Theatre cannot ‘speak the truth’ of Brexit, since that truth is 
impossible to announce from the position of neutrality that confers institutional 
legitimacy on the National. On the contrary, the truth spoken by the National must 
always be, at some level, suspected of recidivism; while the truth of Brexit, in all 
its radicality, cannot but contradict the very space of legitimacy from which the 
National derives its authority to ‘speak’ to and for the ‘nation’. The truth of politics 
is of a completely different order to the discursive truth upon which the cultural 
capital and prestige of the National Theatre rests: it speaks of fundamental 
antagonisms that cannot, in the febrile context of a crisis of general enculturation, 
occupy the same symbolic space. In fact, that symbolic space of orderly and ‘civil’ 
discourse is rendered ‘undecidable’. Thus, while it is no doubt laudable to ‘seek 
and search and strive for good leadership’ (Duffy and Norris 2017: 58), stasis 
betrays the search as always already futile. In his writing on the concept of stasis, 
Giorgio Agamben observes that civil strife, ‘functions as a reactant’ which reveals 
both the ‘threshold of politicisation’ and the undecidability of the distinctions that 
normally demarcate ‘brother and enemy, inside and outside, household and city’ 
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(2015: 13). It is for that reason that in entering the profound confusion of the 
national ‘debate’ on Brexit, the National, like a ship buffeted by powerful 
countervailing winds, could not escape being positioned by one side or the other 
of a deeply polarized nation. With respect to the problem of institutionality -- and 
its critique -- within the context of a general crisis of enculturation, the lesson for 
the National could not be starker: attempting to confer legitimacy on itself only 




1 The sense of confusion witnessed in the contemporary formation of political 
identities can no doubt also be correlated with the collapse of trust in the traditional 
fourth estate. New modes of news distribution across digital platforms have led to the 
emergence of propaganda by algorithm, the rise of the 24 hour news cycles 
(transforming news into a permanent spectacle of mediated catastrophism), 
alongside the steady capture and consolidation of conservative power, over a 
number of years, in information ‘echo chambers’ promoted by media empires such 
as Fox News (as well as the political appropriation of social media sites).   
 
2 The process by which ‘nation’ is constructed through ‘narration’ is, of course, a 
complex one, as Homi K. Bhabha astutely observed, when distinguishing the tension 
between ‘pedagogical’ and ‘performative’ aspects of the ‘narrative address of the 
nation’. ‘It is,’ he wrote, ‘precisely in reading between these borderlines of the nation-
space that we can see how the “people” come to be constituted within a range of 
discourses as a double narrative movement. The people are not simply historical 
events or parts of a patriotic body politic. They are also a complex rhetorical strategy 
of social reference where the claim to be representative provokes a crisis within the 
processes of signification and discursive address. We then have a contested cultural 
territory where the people must be thought in a double time; the people are the 
historical “objects” of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is 
based on a pregiven or constituted historical origin or event; the people are also the 
“subjects” of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary 
presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle of the 
people as that continual process by which the national life is redeemed and signified 
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as a repeating and reproductive process … In the production of the nation as 
narrative there is a split between the continuist accumulative temporality of the 
pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative’ (1990: 297). 
 
3 Brexit has tended to engage specifically English nationalism -- making it more 
isolationist -- while antagonising Scottish nationalism in particular -- making it more 
cosmopolitan. These kinds of paradoxes can only be understood historically, but 
have been produced by the lack of an awareness of history governing the Brexit 
debate. I thank Tom Cornford for this astute observation -- and for his comments on 
an earlier draft of this essay. 
 
4 Brexit, of course, has exposed a major, perhaps irreconcilable, split in the Tory 
party -- between metropolitan socially-liberal neoliberals and ‘traditional 
Conservatives’ in the Churchill mold who see themselves as economic liberals and 
social conservatives. 
 
5 See Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, where Laclau and Mouffe distinguish 
between the diversity of political positions characteristic of democratic politics, in 
contrast to the bifurcated division of the political sphere during the populist moment: 
‘We shall use the term popular subject position to refer to the position that is 
constituted on the basis of dividing the political space into two antagonistic camps; 
and democratic subject position to refer to the locus of a clearly delimited 
antagonism which does not divide society in that way’ (2001: 131). 
 
6 See Welcome, Rufus Norris in Annual Review 2016-17, 
https://review.nationaltheatre.org.uk/#2017/overview/4. 
 
7 In an interview with the Guardian’s Amelia Gentleman, Norris frames the decision 
behind which ‘voices’ were to be included in the play (and by implication, which were 
to be excluded) in relation to both the desire to avoid the perception of ‘metropolitan’ 
‘liberal’ bias -- ‘We push[ed] it further the other way because you understand that the 
majority of people who will come to see it are likely to be on the remain side, 
because theatres are seen as a liberal echo chamber’; and -- as Gentleman reports 
it -- to capture the voices of those (presumably non ‘metropolitan’) ‘citizens trying to 
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come to terms with a rapidly changing nation’. Norris explains: ‘We have been 
incredibly diligent, making sure that what will inevitably be perceived as our pro-
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